When leading from behind is a good thing

Fiscal pressures mandate a defense strategy that accounts for the requisite resources to execute it. Accordingly, it is a propitious time to revisit our NATO commitments. Recently, European President Jean-Claude Juncker called for the formation of a 'European Army' in response to the amplified Russian threat to member states.  Others have called for a consolidated EU Air Force because of the evident benefits of pooling large investments in procurement, operation, and sustainment. Operation Atalanta comprised of EU naval forces which deter acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast has been an undeniable success, but making this European naval force even more remarkable is the juxtaposition with NATO maritime forces

conducting related Operation Ocean Shield counter-piracy operations. Furthermore, both NATO and EU maritime forces operate with Combined Task Force 151 which is the US led multinational counter piracy naval task force. Participating countries are compelled to calibrate their level of commitment to these maritime forces notwithstanding national tasking. It is worth noting that nontraditional partners like Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and even China have joined the counter piracy operations.  Cynics might argue that the rush to join in counter piracy is because piracy is an easy target with an adversary that poses no realistic threat to coalition forces.  By any measure, a sophisticated multi-million dollar ship chasing an outboard powered skiff does not make a lot of sense. The point is that the EU maritime forces are extremely capable and are effectively interchangeable with their counterpart maritime forces.  From the standpoint of command and control, NATO and EU maritime forces enjoy a close relationship to the point where their respective operations centers are collocated.  It would seem to be a no brainer to advance this proof of concept to the next level, and have the EU maritime forces supplant NATO’s.   There are at least three unquestionable benefits: (1) unity of effort, (2) fiscal efficiencies and (3) consistency with US strategy. 

(1) Because the same forces and capabilities form the basis of both EU and NATO defense efforts ("separable, but not separate”), current doctrine  espouses no duplication of what was done effectively under NATO, no decoupling from the US and NATO, and no discrimination against non-EU members such as Turkey. While for the most part, this approach has been successful, there is no doubt that there is duplication of effort (e.g. counter piracy) resulting in separate chains of command that may or may not be aligned.  Consolidating these operations would be of obvious benefit to the unity of effort.  

(2) The drumbeat to rebalance our contribution to NATO was initially sounded by Secretary Gates who famously warned that the alliance risked “a collective military irrelevance” if it continued to rely on the generosity of the US taxpayer which according to NATO’s 2013 annual report was about  73 percent of the alliance’s defense expenditures. Worse is while the US contribution has been increasing our European partners are shrinking their investment.  Secretary Hegel has warned that if the Europeans do not invest in their security, the US will rebalance to partners that share the burden more equitably.  Shifting the cost of mutual security from NATO to the EU, would make the EU responsible for enforcing compliance with contribution guidelines (at least 2% of GDP). The raison d'être for EU defense forces is independence from US control. Now is an opportune occasion for the EU to pick up the slack. Obviously, this transition will need to be a phased approach, maybe taking as long as ten years.  

(3)  US naval strategy has for some time been shifting to an emphasis on promoting and supporting global maritime partnerships. Recently the commander of US naval forces in the Pacific signaled a willingness to support a combined ASEAN maritime patrol in the South China Sea should ASEAN members take the lead. With the stark recognition that the US cannot do it alone, the US must increase its reliance on maritime partnerships. Consistent with these realities, our strategy should include charting a course for consolidating EU and NATO efforts. 

When did lying become acceptable?

In a recent New York Times opinion piece Justin McBrayer laments how this country has lost its moral compass. He and his philosophy professor colleagues have observed that the overwhelming majority of college freshmen in their classrooms view moral claims as mere opinions that are not true.  He makes the point that this troubling phenomenon is rooted in the Common Core standards that  require that students be able to “distinguish among fact, opinion, and reasoned judgment in a text.”  For example, using these evolving standards “all men are created equal” and “drug dealers belong in prison” are considered to be opinions, because these assertions cannot be tested or proven, and are supposedly subjective determinations. The implications are not just academic, because if there are no moral truths how does society prosecute criminal transgressions, or if all humans are not created equal, then why vote for any political system that doesn't benefit you over others? The corollary of turning opinion into fact is equally pernicious. Over the last twenty years this country has tolerated what are simply bold faced lies made to support an agenda or position. "I did not have sex...”, Mitt Romney was a murderer, Ferguson suspect had his hands up, Benghazi was about a video, emails lost at the IRS, and the list goes on. News stories used to be spun depending on the desired impact, these days stories are simply invented. The result is that younger generations are rightfully suspicious of any information that may be politicized.

Thousand Ship Navy Redux

As a guiding principle the Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Revision revisits the concept of a “global network of navies”.  In 2006 Admiral Mullen was a tireless proponent of the Thousand Ship Navy operating concept comprised of an “international fleet of like-minded nations”, foreign navies, commercial shipping companies, and merchant vessels. This concept was controversial with US policymakers because cynics saw a concept that outsourced maritime security due to an inadequate acquisition program, a shrinking shipbuilding capability, and a lack of political will for a strong Navy.  Allies were also critical because they regarded the concept a ploy by the US to gain control over their indigenous maritime assets and could possibly result in being orthogonal to a country’s national interest. Making the concept even more problematic was the long standing distrust between some US partners, particularly in Asia. The concept was not entirely thrown over the transom, as the notion of global maritime partnerships has gained traction due to the nexus of technologies like AIS and a general willingness among nations to share maritime information.  Successful examples usually include counter-piracy off Somalia, the Italian led Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center and the maritime center in Singapore established to ensure maritime security in the straits of Malacca.  The Thousand Ship Navy initiative is indeed a cautionary tale. The lesson learned is to build upon existing successes and move forward a strategy to further increase maritime security partnerships fleshed out in a study completed several years ago by The Naval Studies Board.